Runtime safety and the guard boundary¶
aster is the design-side library. Real AEDT solves are executed by the companion guard
ansys-aedt-mcp, and the two are designed to be used
together with a fail-closed policy.
What the guard enforces (v0.3.2+)¶
- Managed sessions only: AEDT sessions launched through the guard are recorded; attaching to a
session the guard did not launch is refused.
guard_statusclassifies every liveansysedt.exeas managed or unmanaged. - No arbitrary broker code by default:
run_python_code/run_python_scriptare refused at the MCP surface and the worker backend unless a human operator explicitly enables them. - Token-scoped solves: when
AEDT_GUARD_ENFORCE=1, analysis submissions need a run token bound to project/design/setup; guarded-run adapter commands are audited. - Launch/release audit and PyAEDT app identity checks against the verified desktop.
Client rule (mandatory)¶
If the guard MCP tools (mcp__aedt__* in DeepSeek Harness, mcp__ansys-aedt__* in Codex) are not
available, stop. Do not launch ansysedt.exe, do not import PyAEDT, and do not edit .aedt
files. Ask the operator to enable the guard. Ready-to-use fail-closed configurations live in the
guard repository under examples/clients/ (DeepSeek Harness MCP bundle and Codex config/AGENTS).
aster's trusted bridge¶
aster executes its modelling snippets through the guard, which refuses run_python_code by
default. The aster bridge therefore enables AEDT_MCP_ALLOW_ARBITRARY_CODE only for the duration
of its own trusted broker call (the child broker inherits it and the environment is restored
afterwards); DSH and Codex MCP servers are separate processes and stay default-deny. Do not
co-host aster and DSH/Codex in one Python process: that would share the environment and defeat
the scoping. This is an operator-side trusted-tool decision, not something an agent should enable
for a client session.
Residual risk¶
The guard is not an OS sandbox. A same-user process with unrestricted shell can still start AEDT directly; the guard will mark that session unmanaged and refuse to attach, but cannot physically prevent it. For a hard boundary, run the solver under a separate account or VM with AppLocker/WDAC and expose only the guard service. The guard registry and audit log are same-user-writable integrity controls, not a security boundary.
See the guard's THREAT_MODEL and CLIENTS for the full contract.